Voting power in the European Union enlargement

DOI10.1016/S0377-2217(01)00334-4zbMath1073.91539MaRDI QIDQ1848640

J. J. López, N. Jiménez, Jésus Mario Bilbao, Julio R. Fernández

Publication date: 13 November 2002

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

Computational complexityGenerating functionPower indices

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (17)

Three-valued simple games ⋮ Implementing generating functions to obtain power indices with coalition configuration ⋮ The cost of getting local monotonicity ⋮ The distribution of power in the European constitution ⋮ A linear approximation method for the Shapley value ⋮ The complexity of power indexes with graph restricted coalitions ⋮ The Banzhaf index in complete and incomplete shareholding structures: a new algorithm ⋮ Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics ⋮ Spectrum value for coalitional games ⋮ Simple games versus weighted voting games: bounding the critical threshold value ⋮ The Banzhaf power index for ternary bicooperative games ⋮ On the computational complexity of weighted voting games ⋮ The \(cg\)-position value for games on fuzzy communication structures ⋮ Weighted multiple majority games with unions: generating functions and applications to the European Union ⋮ Pseudo polynomial size LP formulation for calculating the least core value of weighted voting games ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES ⋮ Monte Carlo methods for the Shapley-Shubik power index

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

This page was built for publication: Voting power in the European Union enlargement