A continuous rating method for preferential voting: the complete case

DOI10.1007/s00355-011-0548-zzbMath1280.91053arXiv0912.2190OpenAlexW2953349889MaRDI QIDQ1926601

Rosa Camps, Laia Saumell, Xavier Mora

Publication date: 28 December 2012

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/0912.2190

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

A general method for deciding about logically constrained issues ⋮ A continuous rating method for preferential voting. The incomplete case ⋮ Social choice rules driven by propositional logic

Cites Work

• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• Complete independence of clones in the ranked pairs rule
• Combinatorial Data Analysis
• A Fast Algorithm for the Decomposition of Graphs and Posets
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• A theory of measuring, electing, and ranking
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