Epistemic conditions for agreement and stochastic independence of \(\epsilon\)-contaminated beliefs

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(99)00014-1zbMath0941.91007MaRDI QIDQ1974052

Kin Chung Lo

Publication date: 8 May 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategic gamesstochastic independenceagreement\(\varepsilon\)-contamination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items

Distances on probability measures and random variables ⋮ Agreement and stochastic independence of belief functions ⋮ Correlated Nash equilibrium ⋮ Correlated equilibrium under uncertainty

Cites Work

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