Bayesian agency: linear versus tractable contracts

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2022.103684OpenAlexW4214693618MaRDI QIDQ2124461

Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti

Publication date: 11 April 2022

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2106.00319

zbMATH Keywords

contract theoryprincipal-agent problemsBayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Related Items (3)

Learning approximately optimal contracts ⋮ Learning approximately optimal contracts ⋮ Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization

Cites Work

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• Combinatorial agency
• Clique is hard to approximate within \(n^{1-\epsilon}\)
• Proof verification and the hardness of approximation problems
• Adaptive Contract Design for Crowdsourcing Markets: Bandit Algorithms for Repeated Principal-Agent Problems
• Mixed Strategies in Combinatorial Agency
• Free-Riding and Free-Labor in Combinatorial Agency
• Repeated Moral Hazard
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• A Parallel Repetition Theorem
• The Complexity of Contracts

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