How to split the costs and charge the travellers sharing a ride? Aligning system's optimum with users' equilibrium

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2021.11.041zbMath1506.91069arXiv2105.02669OpenAlexW3215375171MaRDI QIDQ2140279

Rafał Kucharski, Javier Alonso-Mora, Oded Cats, Andrés Fielbaum

Publication date: 20 May 2022

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2105.02669

zbMATH Keywords

transportationset coverprice of stabilitycost-sharingridepooling

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games involving graphs (91A43) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (2)

Inhibit violations in business-to-peer product sharing via heterogeneous punishment, firm decisions and subsidies ⋮ Budget-balanced and strategy-proof auctions for ridesharing

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