Power distribution in the Basque parliament using games with externalities
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Publication:2202229
DOI10.1007/s11238-020-09748-2zbMath1471.91437OpenAlexW3010199013MaRDI QIDQ2202229
G. Arévalo-Iglesias, M. Álvarez-Mozos
Publication date: 17 September 2020
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2445/170245
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