Iterated admissibility through forcing in strategic belief models

DOI10.1007/s10849-020-09317-4zbMath1477.03044MaRDI QIDQ2228450

Gianluca Caterina, Jonathan Gangle, Fernando A. Tohmé

Publication date: 17 February 2021

Published in: Journal of Logic, Language and Information (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10849-020-09317-4

zbMATH Keywords

forcing; iterated admissibility; possibility models

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

03B42: Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change)

91A26: Rationality and learning in game theory

03E40: Other aspects of forcing and Boolean-valued models

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