Existence of weakly cooperative equilibria for infinite-leader-infinite-follower games
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Publication:2278717
DOI10.1007/s40305-018-0236-0zbMath1438.91028OpenAlexW2909135486WikidataQ128631471 ScholiaQ128631471MaRDI QIDQ2278717
Publication date: 10 December 2019
Published in: Journal of the Operations Research Society of China (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s40305-018-0236-0
Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Cooperative games (91A12) Spaces of games (91A70)
Related Items (1)
Existence and continuity theorems of \(\alpha\)-core of multi-leader-follower games with set payoffs
Cites Work
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