Multidimensional electoral competition between differentiated candidates

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2017.07.005zbMath1415.91118OpenAlexW2737954867MaRDI QIDQ2411520

Dimitrios Xefteris

Publication date: 24 October 2017

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://papers.econ.ucy.ac.cy/RePEc/papers/01-15.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium existencedifferentiated candidateselectoral competitionmultidimensional model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Two candidate competition on differentiated policy sets

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