Consistent representative democracy
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2427119
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.06.003zbMath1142.91023OpenAlexW2106031097MaRDI QIDQ2427119
Publication date: 8 May 2008
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://authors.library.caltech.edu/80003/
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