Cooperative production under diminishing marginal returns: interpreting fixed-path methods

DOI10.1007/s00355-006-0195-yzbMath1180.91174OpenAlexW2041590589MaRDI QIDQ2460082

Justin Leroux

Publication date: 14 November 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.hec.ca/iea/cahiers/2006/iea0610_jleroux.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative productionfixed-path methodsinverse marginal product proportions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (5)

Profit sharing in unique Nash equilibrium: characterization in the two-agent case ⋮ Secure implementation in production economies ⋮ The price of anarchy of serial, average and incremental cost sharing ⋮ An efficient and almost budget balanced cost sharing method ⋮ Cost sharing with multiple technologies

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility and individual rationality in public good economies
• Ordinal cost sharing
• Double implementation by a simple game form in the commons problem
• Strategic properties of heterogeneous serial cost sharing
• Strong monotonicity in surplus sharing
• Strategy-proofness and efficiency are incompatible in production economies
• Incremental cost sharing: Characterization by coalition strategy-proofness
• Existence and Nash implementation of efficient sharing rules for a commonly owned technology
• The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
• Serial Cost Sharing

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