The theory of contests: a survey

DOI10.1007/s10058-007-0032-5zbMath1274.91345MaRDI QIDQ2462900

Luis C. Corchon

Publication date: 5 December 2007

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10016/3801

zbMATH Keywords

institutions; contests; conflict

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

91-02: Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance

91B99: Mathematical economics

91B26: Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models

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