Distributed knowability and Fitch's paradox
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Publication:2464652
DOI10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9zbMath1132.03004OpenAlexW1969655817MaRDI QIDQ2464652
Publication date: 17 December 2007
Published in: Studia Logica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11225-007-9070-9
Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42)
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