Finding Strategyproof Social Choice Functions via SAT Solving

DOI10.1613/jair.4959zbMath1352.91022OpenAlexW3136440969WikidataQ129489384 ScholiaQ129489384MaRDI QIDQ2794662

Christian Geist, Felix Brandt

Publication date: 11 March 2016

Published in: Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1613/jair.4959

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problem solving in the context of artificial intelligence (heuristics, search strategies, etc.) (68T20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (13)

Algorithmic Decision Theory Meets Logic ⋮ On the tradeoff between efficiency and strategyproofness ⋮ Individually Rational Strategy-Proof Social Choice with Exogenous Indifference Sets ⋮ Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving ⋮ Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties ⋮ Manipulability in a group activity selection problem ⋮ Characterizing the top cycle via strategyproofness ⋮ Set-monotonicity implies Kelly-strategyproofness ⋮ Strategy-proofness of scoring allocation correspondences for indivisible goods ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ An introduction to mechanized reasoning ⋮ A note on the McKelvey uncovered set and Pareto optimality ⋮ Universal Pareto dominance and welfare for plausible utility functions

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