The curse of simultaneity

DOI10.1145/2090236.2090242zbMath1348.91014OpenAlexW2172152464MaRDI QIDQ2826044

Renato Paes Leme, Vasilis Syrgkanis, Éva Tardos

Publication date: 7 October 2016

Published in: Proceedings of the 3rd Innovations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1145/2090236.2090242

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibriumprice of anarchyextensive-form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Analysis of algorithms and problem complexity (68Q25) Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Deterministic scheduling theory in operations research (90B35) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Games in extensive form (91A18) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (24)

The limit of targeting in networks ⋮ Non-cooperative capacitated facility location games ⋮ The Curse of Sequentiality in Routing Games ⋮ Multicast Network Design Game on a Ring ⋮ The quality of equilibria for set packing and throughput scheduling games ⋮ Efficient Equilibria in Polymatrix Coordination Games ⋮ Tight bounds for the price of anarchy and stability in sequential transportation games ⋮ The Inefficiency of Nash and Subgame Perfect Equilibria for Network Routing ⋮ Exact price of anarchy for weighted congestion games with two players ⋮ Uniform price auctions: equilibria and efficiency ⋮ A note on connectivity and stability in dynamic network formation ⋮ Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions ⋮ Improved bounds on equilibria solutions in the network design game ⋮ Economic efficiency requires interaction ⋮ A unifying tool for bounding the quality of non-cooperative solutions in weighted congestion games ⋮ Sequential scheduling on identical machines ⋮ Dynamic resource allocation games ⋮ Load rebalancing games in dynamic systems with migration costs ⋮ The sequential price of anarchy for affine congestion games with few players ⋮ Risk-free bidding in complement-free combinatorial auctions ⋮ Dynamic Resource Allocation Games ⋮ Coordination mechanisms for scheduling selfish jobs with favorite machines ⋮ Some anomalies of farsighted strategic behavior ⋮ On the sequential price of anarchy of isolation games

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