Axiomatizations of Approval Voting
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Publication:2829678
DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_5zbMath1348.91100OpenAlexW2582648MaRDI QIDQ2829678
Publication date: 8 November 2016
Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_5
Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-02) Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)
Related Items (7)
Evaluationwise strategy-proofness ⋮ Dis\&approval voting: a characterization ⋮ Majority rule on \(j\)-rich ballot spaces ⋮ Strongly sincere best responses under approval voting and arbitrary preferences ⋮ Condorcet efficiency of the preference approval voting and the probability of selecting the Condorcet loser ⋮ Approval voting under dichotomous preferences: a catalogue of characterizations ⋮ Approval voting and Arrow's impossibility theorem
Cites Work
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Characterizing approval voting
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Characterizations of scoring methods for preference aggregation
- Collective choice under dichotomous preferences
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