Fair Payments for Efficient Allocations in Public Sector Combinatorial Auctions

DOI10.1287/mnsc.1060.0662zbMath1232.91286OpenAlexW2111450275MaRDI QIDQ3116137

No author found.

Publication date: 21 February 2012

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1060.0662

zbMATH Keywords

core allocationsconstraint generationcombinatorial auctionsbidder-Pareto optimality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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