Distribution of Power under Stochastic Social Choice Rules

DOI10.2307/1912843zbMath0596.90009OpenAlexW1971882802MaRDI QIDQ3730300

Prasanta K. Pattanaik, Bezalel Peleg

Publication date: 1986

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/1912843

zbMATH Keywords

regularityindependence of irrelevant alternativesex-post Pareto optimalityprobabilistic voting procedurestochastic social choice rulesweighted random dictatorship

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (16)

Strategic candidacy for multivalued voting procedures ⋮ A new approach to the implementation problem ⋮ `Regular' choice and the weak axiom of stochastic revealed preference ⋮ A note on the structure of stochastic social choice functions ⋮ Contraction consistent stochastic choice correspondence ⋮ The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ Ordinal versus cardinal voting rules: a mechanism design approach ⋮ An axiomatic theory of political representation ⋮ On probabilistic rationalizability ⋮ Fully sincere voting ⋮ Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers ⋮ Collective judgement: combining individual value judgements ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data

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