Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Uniqueness of a Cournot Equilibrium

DOI10.2307/2297489zbMath0638.90014OpenAlexW2066630787MaRDI QIDQ3779957

Charles D. Kolstad, Lars Mathiesen

Publication date: 1987

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/48611

zbMATH Keywords

fixed point index theorydifferential topologyJacobian of marginal profitsuniqueness of homogeneous product Cournot equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Fixed-point theorems on manifolds (58C30) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Fixed points and coincidences in algebraic topology (55M20)

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