How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?

DOI10.2307/2297581zbMath0657.90021OpenAlexW1985095078MaRDI QIDQ3806954

No author found.

Publication date: 1988

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297581

zbMATH Keywords

HamiltonianNash equilibriumdynamic gametime-consistent policyprecommitmentoptimal government policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Dynamic programming (90C39) Economic growth models (91B62) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (25)

Fiscal policy coordination and EMU. A dynamic game approach ⋮ Dynamic policy in linear models with rational expectations of future events: A computer package ⋮ Politico-economic equilibrium and economic growth ⋮ Uniqueness of Markov-perfect equilibrium in infinite-time affine-quadratic differential games ⋮ Government-private sector relations as a Stackelberg game. A degenerate case ⋮ The envelope theorem for locally differentiable Nash equilibria of discounted and autonomous infinite horizon differential games ⋮ Time-consistent control in nonlinear models ⋮ Optimal policy business cycles ⋮ Optimal introduction of time-of-day tariffs in the presence of consumer adjustment costs ⋮ INTERTEMPORAL INVESTMENTS INTO SYNFUELS ⋮ Time inconsistency in time-dependent team games ⋮ Reputational and nonreputational policies under partial information ⋮ Optimal target zones ⋮ Fiscal policy coordination and EMU ⋮ Large external debt and (slow) domestic growth ⋮ Markov-perfect capital and labor taxes ⋮ Feedback Nash equilibria in optimal taxation problems ⋮ Intertemporal monopolistic pricing of non-durables ⋮ On coincidence of feedback and global Stackelberg equilibria in a class of differential games ⋮ Examples in Dynamic Optimal Taxation ⋮ Time consistent fiscal policies in a Ramsey economy ⋮ THE ISSUE OF TIME INCONSISTENCY REVISITED AS AN EXTENDED GAME ⋮ Credibility and the value of information transmission in a model of monetary policy and inflation ⋮ Credible Linear-Incentive Equilibrium Strategies in Linear-Quadratic Differential Games ⋮ Time Consistency, Subgame Perfectness, Solution Concepts and Information Patterns in Dynamic Models of Stabilization Policies

This page was built for publication: How Should Control Theory Be Used to Calculate a Time-Consistent Government Policy?