Existence and derivation of optimal affine incentive schemes for Stackelberg games with partial information: a geometric approach†
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Publication:3944377
DOI10.1080/00207178208922667zbMath0484.90099OpenAlexW2116201252MaRDI QIDQ3944377
Publication date: 1982
Published in: International Journal of Control (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00207178208922667
existencegeometric approachnormal formderivationleaderfollowerasymmetric information patterndiscriminated playerpartial dynamic informationlinear-quadratic Stackelberg game over Hilbert spacesoptimal affine incentive schemessampled state measurementstwo-person deterministic Stackelberg game
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