The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees–Revisited

DOI10.1287/mnsc.28.8.869zbMath0487.90093OpenAlexW2043821802MaRDI QIDQ3948902

Pradeep Dubey

Publication date: 1982

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.28.8.869

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valueairport managementfair cost allocation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Operations research and management science (90B99)

Related Items (16)

The Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approach ⋮ Operations research games: A survey. (With comments and rejoinder) ⋮ A note on the Shapley value for airport cost pooling game ⋮ The airport problem with capacity constraints ⋮ On the Shapley value of liability games ⋮ Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values ⋮ Depreciation games ⋮ Sharing the cost of redundant items ⋮ On how to allocate the fixed cost of transport systems ⋮ A simple algorithm for the nucleolus of airport profit games ⋮ Balancedness of infrastructure cost games. ⋮ Compromise values in cooperative game theory ⋮ An extension of the \(\tau\)-value to games with coalition structures. ⋮ Transversality of the Shapley value ⋮ Owen's coalitional value and aircraft landing fees ⋮ Airport problems and consistent allocation rules.

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