Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price
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Publication:4319568
DOI10.2307/2951754zbMath0816.90047OpenAlexW3123492928MaRDI QIDQ4319568
Robert H. Porter, Kenneth Hendricks, Charles A. Wilson
Publication date: 11 January 1995
Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2951754
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