Price Formation in Single Call Markets

DOI10.2307/2171895zbMath0872.90015OpenAlexW2015461367MaRDI QIDQ4340492

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Publication date: 10 June 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171895

zbMATH Keywords

learningauctionsprice formationBayesian Nash equilibriumsimple market institutionsingle call market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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