Reputation and Experimentation in Repeated Games With Two Long-Run Players

DOI10.2307/2171882zbMath0898.90142OpenAlexW2018173322MaRDI QIDQ4359768

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Publication date: 20 October 1997

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2171882

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationrepeated gamereputationcommitment strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (9)

Optimal policy with credibility concerns ⋮ Reputation in the long-run with imperfect monitoring ⋮ Indeterminacy of reputation effects in repeated games with contracts ⋮ Reputation Effects ⋮ The emergence of cooperation through leadership ⋮ Commitment in first-price auctions ⋮ Reputation effects in stochastic games with two long-lived players ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ Reciprocity and cooperation in repeated coordination games: The principled-player approach

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