scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1099353

zbMath0968.91505MaRDI QIDQ4369412

Françoise Forges

Publication date: 28 January 1998

Title: zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Economics of information (91B44) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (15)

Bush‐Mosteller learning for a zero-sum repeated game with random pay-offs ⋮ Feasibility and individual rationality in two-person Bayesian games ⋮ Kernel Entropy Discriminant Analysis for Dimension Reduction ⋮ Dynamic information design: a simple problem on optimal sequential information disclosure ⋮ Reputation and perfection in repeated common interest games ⋮ A property of Nash equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information ⋮ The existence of equilibria in certain games, separation for families of convex functions and a theorem of Borsuk-Ulam type ⋮ Bayesian repeated games and reputation ⋮ Information spillover in multiple zero-sum games ⋮ Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information: characterization and existence ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ An infinitely repeated rental model with incomplete information ⋮ Strategic learning in games with symmetric information. ⋮ Self-fulfilling mechanisms in Bayesian games ⋮ Merging, reputation, and repeated games with incomplete information

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