Fooling All of the People Some of the Time: A Theory of Endogenous Sequencing in Confidential Negotiations

DOI10.1111/j.1467-937X.2004.00307.xzbMath1103.91017OpenAlexW1524285670MaRDI QIDQ4664532

Jun Wang, Thomas H. Noe

Publication date: 5 April 2005

Published in: Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-937x.2004.00307.x

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriabargaining gamesequencing uncertainty

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (9)

Multilateral bargaining with an endogenously determined procedure ⋮ One-to-many bargaining when pairwise agreements are non-renegotiable ⋮ Breakdown in multilateral negotiations ⋮ Bargaining orders in a multi-person bargaining game ⋮ Expropriation power in private dealings: quota rule in collective sales ⋮ On the role of confidentiality and deadlines in bilateral negotiations ⋮ Sequential negotiations with costly information acquisition ⋮ Sequential vote buying ⋮ Assembly Problems

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