Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition

DOI10.3982/TE2717zbMath1396.91570OpenAlexW2807491127WikidataQ129761679 ScholiaQ129761679MaRDI QIDQ4682746

Yuichiro Kamada, Fuhito Kojima

Publication date: 19 September 2018

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te2717

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitystrategy-proofnesshierarchyschool choicematching with constraintsmatching with contractsmedical residency matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items

Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment, Lone wolves in infinite, discrete matching markets, Menu mechanisms, School choice with preference rank classes, Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps, Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching, Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves, Refined computational complexities of hospitals/residents problem with regional caps, On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching, Student-optimal interdistrict school choice: district-based versus school-based admissions, The equivalence between costly and probabilistic voting models, Entering classes in the college admissions model, Market Design, Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints, Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas, Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers