Are We There Yet? Mechanism Design Beyond Equilibrium

DOI10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_12zbMath1443.91098OpenAlexW2947996795MaRDI QIDQ5111108

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Publication date: 26 May 2020

Published in: Studies in Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-93809-7_12

zbMATH Keywords

equilibriummechanism designpublic-goods problemWalrasian exchange model

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• A simple market-like allocation mechanism for public goods
• Out-of-equilibrium performance of three Lindahl mechanisms: experimental evidence
• A stable Nash mechanism implementing Lindahl allocations for quasi-linear environments
• A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• On the Generic Nonoptimality of Dominant-Strategy Allocation Mechanisms: A General Theorem That Includes Pure Exchange Economies
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Price-Quantity Strategic Market Games

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