Commitment robust equilibria and endogenous timing

DOI10.1006/GAME.1996.0069zbMath0858.90140OpenAlexW2042378555MaRDI QIDQ1815584

Sjaak Hurkens, Eric E. C. van Damme

Publication date: 9 December 1996

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/files/1144895/EDSH5621787.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

mixed equilibriatiming gamestrong evolutionary solution concepts

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

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