EXPLAINING PRIVATE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS BY CONDITIONAL COOPERATION: AN INDIRECT EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH
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Publication:5467125
DOI10.1111/j.1467-999X.2006.00233.xzbMath1121.91034OpenAlexW2153851213MaRDI QIDQ5467125
Publication date: 23 May 2006
Published in: Metroeconomica (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-999x.2006.00233.x
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