Existence of general bargaining sets for cooperative games without side payments

DOI10.1090/S0002-9904-1970-12484-3zbMath0193.19502OpenAlexW1982328978MaRDI QIDQ5588287

Billera, Louis J.

Publication date: 1970

Published in: Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1090/s0002-9904-1970-12484-3

zbMATH Keywords

operations research

Related Items (13)

On the sensitivity of von Neumann and Morgenstern abstract stable sets: The stable and the individual stable bargaining set ⋮ The reactive bargaining set: Structure, dynamics and extension to NTU games ⋮ An existence theorem for a bargaining set ⋮ On the non-emptiness of the one-core and the bargaining set of committee games ⋮ Stability when mobility is restricted by the existing coalition structure ⋮ A three-person cooperative game formulation of the world oil market ⋮ A theory of farsightedness in committee games ⋮ Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments ⋮ Stable bargaining outcomes in patent licensing: a cooperative game approach without side payments ⋮ On games without side payments arising from a general class of markets ⋮ Generalised bargaining sets for cooperative games ⋮ Game theory and the French apparentements of 1951 ⋮ The bilateral consistent prekernel for NTU games

Cites Work

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• Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
• Equilibrium Points for Open Acyclic Relations
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• Existence of stable payoff configurations for cooperative games
• Existence theorem for the bargaining set 𝑀₁^{(𝑖)}

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