Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6187757
DOI10.1007/s11229-021-03242-0zbMath1529.91031MaRDI QIDQ6187757
Philippe Solal, Eric Rémila, Susumu Cato
Publication date: 1 February 2024
Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items (1)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Asymptotic utilitarianism in scoring rules
- The theory of judgment aggregation: an introductory review
- Variable-population voting rules
- A characterization result for approval voting with a variable set of alternatives
- Aggregating sets of judgments: two impossibility results compared. With a comment by Isaac Levi
- On the informational efficiency of simple scoring rules
- Independent necessary and sufficient conditions for approval voting
- A simple characterization of approval voting
- Approval voting on dichotomous preferences
- Weighted approval voting
- Scoring rules on dichotomous preferences
- Size approval voting
- Characterizing approval voting
- On some problems arising from Professor Rawls' conception of distributive justice
- A proof technique for social choice with variable electorate
- Axioms for approval voting: Direct proof
- Arrow's theorem and Turing computability
- Intertemporal equity and the extension of the Ramsey criterion.
- Infinite populations, choice and determinacy
- Resolving distributional conflicts between generations
- May's theorem with an infinite population
- Intergenerational equity: Sup, inf, lim sup, and lim inf
- Utilitarianism for infinite utility streams: a new welfare criterion and its axiomatic characterization
- Non-anonymous ballot aggregation: an axiomatic generalization of approval voting
- Infinite-horizon social evaluation with variable population size
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- An Axiomatic Basis for the Ramsey-Weizsacker Overtaking Criterion
This page was built for publication: Infinite-population approval voting: a proposal
