The following pages link to Truth and paradox (Q1839240):
Displayed 50 items.
- From closure games to strong Kleene truth (Q286693) (← links)
- Sets and plural comprehension (Q484118) (← links)
- Alternative ways for truth to behave when there's no vicious reference (Q484147) (← links)
- Montague's theorem and modal logic (Q488358) (← links)
- Some notes on truths and comprehension (Q722023) (← links)
- A framework for riddles about truth that do not involve self-reference (Q763326) (← links)
- Logic of paradox revisited (Q795814) (← links)
- A fixed point theorem for the weak Kleene valuation scheme (Q795819) (← links)
- Paradox, truth and logic. I. Paradox and truth (Q798312) (← links)
- Four valued semantics and the Liar (Q798313) (← links)
- What truth depends on (Q815014) (← links)
- Periodicity and reflexivity in revision sequences (Q897483) (← links)
- Jump liars and Jourdain's card via the relativized T-scheme (Q1015486) (← links)
- Two types of deflationism (Q1024123) (← links)
- How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result (Q1069920) (← links)
- Some remarks on extending and interpreting theories with a partial predicate for truth (Q1093626) (← links)
- An axiomatic approach to self-referential truth (Q1096626) (← links)
- Tarski on ``essentially richer'' metalanguages (Q1283316) (← links)
- What the Liar taught Achilles (Q1283319) (← links)
- What's in a function? (Q1293042) (← links)
- Quantified Quinean \(S5\) (Q1310623) (← links)
- Property theory: The type-free approach \(v\). The Church approach (Q1319264) (← links)
- Dynamic semantics and circular propositions (Q1325775) (← links)
- Non-well-founded sets via revision rules (Q1337508) (← links)
- A theory of truth that prefers falsehood (Q1366760) (← links)
- Boolean paradoxes and revision periods (Q1685479) (← links)
- Unified grounding (Q1706747) (← links)
- Self-referential propositions (Q1708964) (← links)
- Possible-worlds semantics for modal notions conceived as predicates (Q1810820) (← links)
- Alternative revision theories of truth (Q1815415) (← links)
- Frege's new science (Q1860968) (← links)
- A contextual-hierarchical approach to truth and the liar paradox (Q1876081) (← links)
- A system of complete and consistent truth (Q1893134) (← links)
- A contingent Russell's paradox (Q1924332) (← links)
- How truth behaves when there's no vicious reference (Q1959327) (← links)
- Revision without revision sequences: self-referential truth (Q2000672) (← links)
- Notes on Leitgeb's Ruitenburg (Q2027211) (← links)
- What paradoxes depend on (Q2054131) (← links)
- Outline of an intensional theory of truth (Q2134277) (← links)
- Designing paradoxes: a revision-theoretic approach (Q2155938) (← links)
- Herzberger's limit rule with labelled sequent calculus (Q2193976) (← links)
- Comparing more revision and fixed-point theories of truth (Q2236597) (← links)
- Reference, paradoxes and truth (Q2268775) (← links)
- Toward a theory of play: a logical perspective on games and interaction (Q2344965) (← links)
- Cofinally invariant sequences and revision (Q2350973) (← links)
- Conditionals in theories of truth (Q2410892) (← links)
- Limits in the revision theory. More than just definite verdicts (Q2420711) (← links)
- Rethinking revision (Q2420716) (← links)
- Instability and contraction. \textit{Méditations hégéliennes}. I (Q2420717) (← links)
- Variations on a Montagovian theme (Q2443347) (← links)