AES side-channel countermeasure using random tower field constructions
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1979283 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1979284 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1979285 (Why is no real title available?)
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- A Unified Framework for the Analysis of Side-Channel Key Recovery Attacks
- A Very Compact S-Box for AES
- A Very Compact “Perfectly Masked” S-Box for AES
- Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems - CHES 2004
- Fast Software Encryption
- Higher-order glitches free implementation of the AES using secure multi-party computation protocols
- Mixed bases for efficient inversion in \({\mathbb F}_{((2^2)^2)^2}\) and conversion matrices of \texttt{SubBytes} of AES
- Montgomery’s Trick and Fast Implementation of Masked AES
- Secure hardware implementation of nonlinear functions in the presence of glitches
- Secure multiplicative masking of power functions
- Selected Areas in Cryptography
Cited in
(5)- On masked Galois-field multiplication for authenticated encryption resistant to side channel analysis
- The schedulability of AES as a countermeasure against side channel attacks
- Comprehensive evaluation of AES dual ciphers as a side-channel countermeasure
- Fast Software Encryption
- An Efficient Side-Channel Protected AES Implementation with Arbitrary Protection Order
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