A Mechanism-Design Approach to Speculative Trade

DOI10.1111/J.1468-0262.2007.00770.XMaRDI QIDQ5441628zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Kfir Eliaz, Ran Spiegler

Publication date 15 February 2008

Published in Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0262.2007.00770.x

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60)

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(16)

• Bargaining over bets
• Ex ante incentive efficient trading mechanisms without the private valuation restriction
• Do sellers exploit biased beliefs of buyers? An experiment
• Efficient mechanisms for level-\(k\) bilateral trading
• Mechanism design with level-k types: theory and an application to bilateral trade
• Mechanism design with possibilistic beliefs
• Flexible contracts
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1644099 (Why is no real title available?)
• Inducing agents to report hidden trades: a theory of an intermediary
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1054793 (Why is no real title available?)
• Speculative partnership dissolution with auctions
• A STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF SPECULATIVE TRADE IN A TWO-SIDED ASSET MARKET WITH INFORMATION DIVERSITY
• Optimal initial coin offering under speculative token trading
• On efficient partnership dissolution under ex post individual rationality
• Efficient incentives with social preferences
• Optimal speculative trade among large traders

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