Bargaining and waning commitments

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2006.03.031MaRDI QIDQ1929432zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Pablo Amorós, Bernardo Moreno

Publication date 8 January 2013

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.031

zbMATH Keywords

bilateral bargainingsubgame perfect Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Noncooperative games (91A10) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Recommendations

• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Bargaining without commitment
• Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic

Cites work

• A bargaining model based on the commitment tactic
• A Theory of Disagreement in Bargaining
• Bargaining with imperfect commitment
• Deadline effects and inefficient delay in bargaining with endogenous commitment
• Delay in multilateral bargaining under complete information
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
• Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two-period example

Cited in

(7)

• Bargaining on behalf of a constituency
• On the influence of hard leverage in a soft leverage bargaining game: the importance of credible claims
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Tough negotiations: bilateral bargaining with durable commitments
• Concession crossover in electronic negotiations
• Bargaining as a struggle between competing attempts at commitment
• Bargaining with habit formation

This page was built for publication: Bargaining and waning commitments

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1929432)