Boundedness of the range of a strategy-proof social choice function
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Cites work
- A characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions for economies with pure public goods
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Generalized median voter schemes and committees
- Handbook of social choice and welfare. Vol. 2
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Strategy-proof social choice with continuous separable preferences
- Strategy-proof voting on compact ranges
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Voting under constraints
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