Course allocation with credits via stable matching

DOI10.1007/978-3-032-03639-1_16MaRDI QIDQ6851596zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors David F. Manlove, José Rodríguez

Publication date 27 February 2026

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-03639-1_16

zbMATH Keywords

course allocationlower quotasmaster listsstable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68)

Cites work

• Algorithmics of matching under preferences. With a foreword by Kurt Mehlhorn
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Course bidding at business schools
• Course Match: A Large-Scale Implementation of Approximate Competitive Equilibrium from Equal Incomes for Combinatorial Allocation
• Deferred acceptance algorithms: history, theory, practice, and open questions
• Hard variants of stable marriage.
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1405659 (Why is no real title available?)
• Keeping partners together: Algorithmic results for the hospitals/residents problem with couples
• Matching with indifferences: a comparison of algorithms in the context of course allocation
• Matching with sizes (or scheduling with processing set restrictions)
• NP-complete stable matching problems
• Optimization-based mechanisms for the course allocation problem
• Pareto optimal matchings of students to courses in the presence of prerequisites
• Pareto optimal matchings with lower quotas
• Some remarks on the stable matching problem
• The college admissions problem with lower and common quotas
• The stable marriage problem with master preference lists
• Weighted school choice problems and the weighted top trading cycles mechanism

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