Deterministic refund mechanisms

DOI10.1007/978-3-032-03639-1_20MaRDI QIDQ6851589zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Saeed Alaei, Shuchi Chawla, Zhiyi Huang, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian

Publication date 27 February 2026

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-032-03639-1_20

zbMATH Keywords

approximate optimalitydeterministic mechanism designonline retailersreturn policies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites work

• Algorithmic Price Discrimination
• An optimal auction for capacity constrained bidders: a network perspective
• Auctions with costly information acquisition
• Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
• Mechanism design with costly verification and limited punishments
• Multi-parameter mechanism design and sequential posted pricing
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction
• Optimal sales contracts with withdrawal rights
• Pricing ordered items
• Pricing randomized allocations
• Revenue management by sequential screening
• Robust Mechanism Design
• Sales talk, cancellation terms and the role of consumer protection
• Search deterrence
• Sequential screening
• The menu-size complexity of revenue approximation
• The scope of sequential screening with ex post participation constraints
• Third-degree price discrimination versus uniform pricing

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