Disclosure in epidemics

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2022.105469MaRDI QIDQ2673170zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Ju Hu, Zhen Zhou

Publication date 9 June 2022

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2022.105469

zbMATH Keywords

congestiondisclosureepidemicsinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Potential and congestion games (91A14) Economics of information (91B44) Epidemiology (92D30)

Recommendations

• Information disclosure and vaccination externalities
• On the optimal disclosure of queue length information
• Optimal information disclosure policies in a strategic queueing model
• Optimal epidemic suppression under an ICU constraint: an analytical solution
• An informational rationale for action over disclosure

Cites work

• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3068103 (Why is no real title available?)
• Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach
• Optimal test allocation
• Persuasion of a privately informed receiver
• Pooled testing for quarantine decisions
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Testing alone is insufficient

Cited in

(6)

• A model of reporting and controlling outbreaks by public health agencies
• Information disclosure and vaccination externalities
• Contagion management through information disclosure
• Information design in allocation with costly verification
• Plague and prejudice: disease, discrimination, and social exclusion
• Dynamic information design in an entry game

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