Efficiency, sorting, and selection

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2025.103187MaRDI QIDQ6895985zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Esteban Peralta

Publication date 24 November 2025

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2025.103187

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencyincomplete informationselectionsortingstability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39)

Cites work

• Incomplete information and singleton cores in matching markets
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Learning by matching
• Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
• On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values

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