Learning by matching

DOI10.3982/TE3088MaRDI QIDQ3299503zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Yi-Chun Chen, Gaoji Hu

Publication date 23 July 2020

Published in Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.3982/te3088

zbMATH Keywords

convergenceincomplete informationlearning-blocking pathstabilitytwo-sided matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Labor markets (91B39) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information

Cited in

(12)

• Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information
• Matching and anonymity
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4200052 (Why is no real title available?)
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
• Job matching within and across firms
• Tailored recommendations on a matching platform
• Bayesian stable states
• Not all is lost: sorting and self-stabilizing sets
• Efficiency, sorting, and selection
• Lone wolves just got lonelier
• Epistemic implications of stable allocations
• Learning by mirror averaging

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