Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2021.07.001MaRDI QIDQ2049497zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Fanqi Shi

Publication date 25 August 2021

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.07.001

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationinvestmentsequential matchingstable matching

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Investment and Competitive Matching
• Matching markets under (in)complete information
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Cites work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Existence of stable allocations in matching markets with infinite contracts: a topological approach
• Multiperiod matching
• On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Stability in dynamic matching markets
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• The assignment game. I: The core

Cited in

(7)

• Synchronized matching with incomplete information
• Sequential entry in one-to-one matching markets
• Learning by matching
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Surplus efficiency of ex ante investments in matching markets with nontransferabilities
• Sequential entry in many-to-one matching markets

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