Epistemic implications of stable allocations

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103284MaRDI QIDQ7364434zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Esteban Peralta

Publication date 2 October 2026

Published in Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.JMATECO.2026.103284

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mathematical economics (91Bxx)

Cites work

• Bayesian stable states
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
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• Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
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• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
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• On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Stable matching under forward‐induction reasoning
• Stable matching with incomplete information
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values

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