Efficient constrained combinatorial auctions
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Recommendations
- Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space
- Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
- Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- Characterizing incentive compatible, Pareto optimal and sufficiently anonymous constrained combinatorial mechanisms -- two players case
- Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
Cites work
- Autocratic mechanisms: a form of dictatorship in constrained combinatorial auctions
- Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
- The incompatibility of Pareto optimality and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility in sufficiently-anonymous budget-constrained quasilinear settings
Cited in
(21)- Time bounds for iterative auctions: a unified approach by discrete convex analysis
- Simple combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- Efficient combinatorial allocations: individual rationality versus stability
- Towards characterizing the deterministic combinatorial constrained efficient space
- Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints
- Incentive compatible mulit-unit combinatorial auctions: a primal dual approach
- Characterizing the incentive compatible and Pareto optimal efficiency space for two players, \(k\) items, public budget and quasilinear utilities
- A formulation of combinatorial auction via reverse convex programming
- Automated design of revenue-maximizing combinatorial auctions
- Dictatorial mechanisms in constrained combinatorial auctions
- Optimal Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions and Combinatorial Public Projects via Convex Rounding
- Autocratic mechanisms: a form of dictatorship in constrained combinatorial auctions
- Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders
- On the Economic Efficiency of the Combinatorial Clock Auction
- Mechanisms and impossibilities for truthful, envy-free allocations
- An Efficient Winner Approximation for a Series of Combinatorial Auctions
- An efficient multi-item dynamic auction with budget constrained bidders
- Auction/Belief Propagation Algorithms for Constrained Assignment Problem
- Computing and Combinatorics
- Iterative Dutch combinatorial auctions
- Hierarchical package bidding: a paper \& pencil combinatorial auction
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