Equilibrium Selection in the Two-Population KMR Model

DOI10.1142/S0219198903001045MaRDI QIDQ4433465zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Burkhard Hehenkamp

Publication date 2003

Published in International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198903001045

zbMATH Keywords

co-ordination gamesequilibrium selectionEvolutionmutation dominancerisk dominancestochastic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cites work

• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
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• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 47120 (Why is no real title available?)
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Cited in

(6)

• Simple and clever decision rules for a model of evolution
• Multi-level evolution in population games
• Mutation rates and equilibrium selection under stochastic evolutionary dynamics
• A Comment on "Learning, Mutation, and Long-Run Equilibria in Games"
• EVOLUTION WITH ENDOGENOUS MUTATIONS
• Rule evolution and equilibrium selection

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