Equilibrium analysis in majority-based coalitional bargaining games
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Cites work
- A generalization of Brouwer's fixed point theorem
- A noncooperative bargaining game with endogenous protocol and partial breakdown
- A noncooperative coalitional bargaining game with random proposers
- A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
- A Stochastic Model of Sequential Bargaining with Complete Information
- A theory of endogenous coalition structures
- Bargaining in the shadow of power
- Coalition and party formation in a legislative voting game
- Coalition Formation with Binding Agreements
- Coalitional bargaining games with random proposers: theory and application
- Coalitional bargaining games: a new concept of value and coalition formation
- Coalitional bargaining in networks
- Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
- Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals
- Computation of equilibrium values in the Baron and Ferejohn bargaining model
- Efficient delays in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Existence and efficiency of a stationary subgame-perfect equilibrium in coalitional bargaining models with nonsuperadditive payoffs
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 54098 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3263866 (Why is no real title available?)
- Legislative bargaining and coalition formation
- Majority rule in a stochastic model of bargaining
- Multilateral negotiations and formation of coalitions
- Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
- Sequential formation of coalitions in games with externalities and fixed payoff division
- Some unpleasant bargaining arithmetic?
- Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model
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