Formal Structure of Majority Decision
From MaRDI portal
Cited in
(16)- An axiomatic theory of political representation
- Heights of representative systems: A proof of Fishburn's conjecture
- Heights of representative systems
- On a concept of representative democracy
- Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
- Analysis of weighted median filters based on inequalities relating the weights
- Representation in majority tournaments
- Majority rule for profiles of arbitrary length, with an emphasis on the consistency axiom
- Consistent representative democracy
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- Three-valued representative systems
- Gerrymander-proof representative democracies
- Representing voting rules in Łukasiewicz's three-valued logic
- Representations of binary decision rules by generalized decisiveness structures
- An axiomatic characterization of the proportional threshold methods: a geometric approach
- Individual powers and social consent: an axiomatic approach
This page was built for publication: Formal Structure of Majority Decision
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5531582)
