From evolutionary to strategic stability.

DOI10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00078-4MaRDI QIDQ1420876zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Klaus Ritzberger, Stefano De Michelis

Publication date 23 January 2004

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00078-4

zbMATH Keywords

Dynamic stabilityEvolutionary game theoryIndex theoryStrategic stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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Cited in

(24)

• Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens
• Riemannian game dynamics
• Inefficient stage Nash is not stable
• On forward induction and evolutionary and strategic stability
• Universality of Nash components
• The algebraic geometry of perfect and sequential equilibrium: an extension
• Nash blocks
• On the topology of the set of Nash equilibria
• On the evolutionary selection of sets of Nash equilibria
• On the relationship between uniqueness and stability in sum-aggregative, symmetric and general differentiable games
• Where strategic and evolutionary stability depart -- a study of minimal diversity games
• Dynamics of the Nash map in the game of Matching Pennies
• Perturbations of set-valued dynamical systems, with applications to game theory
• Local stability of strict equilibria under evolutionary game dynamics
• Evolutionary game theory
• On sustainable equilibria
• Polytope-form games and index/degree theories for extensive-form games
• Evolutionary dynamics of signals with type-specific payoff increments
• The evolutionary dynamics of costly signaling
• Solid outcomes in finite games
• Stochastic evolutionary stability in extensive form games of perfect information
• Epistemically robust strategy subsets
• A note on asymptotic stability and game blocks
• Stochastic better-reply dynamics in finite games

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